I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative diversity is a relatively new physical layer approach which helps to achieve performance gains similar to multiple-input multi-output (l\1IMO) enabled transmissions in wireless networks compared to traditional single-input single output (SISO) links. With cooperative transmissions, several nodes with single antennas form a virtual antenna array to assist each other with the transmission of messages. When a virtual antenna array is created only for transmitting to a single receiving node, the approach is called virtual multiple input single-output (vMISO) [1] . The way vMISO works is as follows. A cooperative transmission is initiated by a source node multi-casting (or broadcasting) a message to a number of cooperating relay nodes, which then send the message to the destination node (together with the source node) using techniques such as space-time coding. The destination node combines the signals from the source and relays appropriately to decode the message. Cooperative transmissions exploit a fundamental feature of the wireless medium: the ability to achieve diversity through independent channels created between the multiple transmitters and the receiver, because these channels are likely to fade independently. The resulting advantages (widely studied previously at the physical layer [2] ) are a better bit-error rate (BER) for a given transmission rate and/or a longer transmission range for a given BER while Istanbul, Turkey Email: oercetin@sabanciuniv.edu consuming the same amount of transmission power compared to non-cooperative transmissions. These advantages can also provide energy efficient routing and a longer lifetime for sensor networks. From a security point of view, cooperative transmissions suffer from drawbacks. With more relay nodes, a higher order of diversity can be achieved improving the BER and/or range with cooperative transmissions. However, at the same time, security threats increase with the involvement of additional parties to the communication. For example, even if one of the nodes that form the virtual antenna array is malicious, it can disrupt the transmission, or it can transmit garbled symbols in order to both corrupt the transmission and drain the batteries of honest nodes.
In this paper, we develop a framework for evaluating the per formance difference between using cooperative transmissions or not for successful reception of packets in sensor networks with a mix of honest and malicious and/or compromised nodes. While this could apply for any multi-hop wireless network, we consider here a sensor network with multi-hop transmissions where key pre-distribution schemes may be employed for security [3] . Even with key pre-distribution, not all pairs of sensor nodes share a key, but many pairs do. Thus, it is very likely that each SISO link on a route from a source to the destination is secure when there are no compromised nodes. The presence of compromised nodes will however disrupt a path from the source to the destination and data packets will not successfully reach the destination. As the number of hops to the destination increases, the chance of a successful reception at the destination drops. When cooperative transmissions are employed with vl\1ISO, for the same link reliability, the number of hops to the destination may be reduced making it more likely that the packet is successfully received at the destination (see Figure 1) . The reduction in the number of hops increases as the number of cooperating nodes increases. However, not all of the potential cooperating nodes may share a key and/or some of these nodes may be compromised or malicious. In such cases, vMISO may fare worse than longer SISO links.
It is not easy to predict what circumstances are better for vMISO or SISO for various reasons. First, the diversity benefits increase with the number of cooperating relays, but the relation is non-linear. Second, the chance of involvement of malicious or compromised nodes depend on their number in the network and the distance between source and destination.
Third, various key pre-distribution schemes have different probabilities of sharing secret keys with neighbors that may act as relays. The contribution of this paper is an analytical framework that includes these parameters so that it is possible to evaluate the boundaries of where vMISO or SISO fare bet ter. We do however make simplifying assumptions (e.g., we do not explicitly account for node density). Our analysis allowed us to determine a general condition where vMISO has a better probability of successfully delivering a packet than SISO as nKv < Ks, where n is the number of cooperating nodes that is used at each hop of a multi-hop vMISO route, and Kv and Ks are the number of hops required to reach a destination from the source with vMISO and SISO, respectively. This condition holds when the number of honest nodes in the neighborhood of a node is much higher than n. As expected, our analysis shows that while using vMISO, a small n is preferable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present some background and related work on cooperative transmissions and some possible attacks against cooperative transmissions. Section III describes the framework for analyz ing the probability of successfully receiving a packet at the destination with SISO and vMISO, with and without the use of shared keys. Section IV presents the results obtained from the analysis. Section V concludes the paper and outlines its limitations.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we briefly describe the background material needed for the rest of this paper and some related work.
We do not look at an exhaustive review of the literature on cooperative diversity for which we refer to [1] , [2] , [4] . Cooperative transmissions can improve the quality or range of a link by creating virtual antenna arrays comprised of a source and some of its neighbors. In a vMISO system, a cluster of cooperating nodes emulate the antenna array of a real MISO system [1] . There is a single head node in this cluster that is the originator of data, and there are multiple 2 cooperating nodes each of which act as a transmitter antenna in an antenna array. Unlike real MISO systems, antennas are not co-located in vMISO systems. The source first broadcasts or multicasts its packet to its neighboring relays and they all then simultaneously transmit the packet to the receiver(s).
A. Cooperative Transmissions
Once all nodes in the cluster have the original data, they can encode data using an appropriate space-time block code (STBC) [5] , and simultaneously transmit the coded block to a receiver. Figure 1 shows examples of SISO and vMISO routes between a source S and a destination D. The SISO route is 4 hops long and goes through intermediate nodes h,h,h.
The vMISO route is two hops long, but each hop has three transmitters (S,Rl,R2 for the first hop and h,R3,R4 along the second hop). The assumptions underlying the benefits from vMISO are that each individual link (e.g., S to h or R2 to fd in Figure 1 is independently fading. Thus, the vMISO link is more reliable because of the inherent diversity.
There are several physical layer related issues that we do not elaborate upon here. It is possible to overcome these challenges using physical layer techniques [1] . For example, in order to leverage the benefits of space-diversity, data should be encoded by a space time block code. An STBC with code rate In = k/kn, In :s: 1, is defined by a transmission matrix of size kn x n, where n is the number of (virtual) transmitter antenna elements and kn is the number of time units involved in the transmission of k symbols [5] . The simplest STBC is the Alamouti code, which has unit rate [6] , n = 2 co located antennas or n = 2 cooperating relays, and transmitting two symbols every two time units. STBCs suitable for higher numbers of transmitter antennas or cooperating relays have also been developed (see for e.g., [7] ). In order to decode the transmitted block successfully, the receiver node requires channel state information (CSI) between itself and each of the transmitting nodes. CSI is obtained by using pilot tones transmitted by each node prior to the data transmission. Some loose synchronization between S, Rl and R2 is necessary but the impact of different node locations (as against colocated antennas) has been shown to be minimal [1] . The individual links are typically assumed to be flat-fading.
In this paper, we ignore the protocols and overhead associ ated with identifying nodes such as Rl and R2 at every link as this has been previously considered in other work and is also not the focus of this paper. For instance, in [1] a primary SISO route is first created and then this primary route is used to create a vMISO route. In [2] , a greedy geographical routing scheme is used. We also ignore the medium access issues in this paper. Modifications to the traditional request-to-send (RTS) and c1ear-to-send (CTS) handshakes to avoid collisions and hidden terminals are possible [1] . claim more than one identity, which will cause the source node to believe that it has n relays, while in reality it has m < n relays. If STBC is used as part of the cooperation scheme, the cooperative transmission simply is not realized.
If any other uncoded cooperation scheme is used, given certain BER requirements, a source node cannot transmit its data to the destination which is in the transmission range if there are n nodes in the cooperation set, but outside the range if there are m < n nodes. The necessity of symmetric links in cooperative transmissions adds another problem to the mix. For a symmetric cooperative link between source and destination nodes, they both must have at least the same number of relays. For example, if a source node has n relays, the destination must also have at least n relays.
With a routing algorithm where the routing metric favors nodes with higher numbers of relays, a malicious node may try to convince others that it has a higher number of relays in its neighborhood or that other nodes have fewer relays. This way it may attract traffic to itself which then never reaches the destination.
An attacker can jam the channel during the transmission of pilot tones that are often needed with cooperative transmis sions in order to prevent successful estimation of CSI at the receiver. In such a case, the receiver cannot decode symbols successfully. Selectively jamming some transmissions will also damage packets at the receiver. In addition, control packet corruption attacks are possible that allow a malicious node to disrupt the successful reception of a packet.
2) Other Attacks: One of the advantages of cooperative di versity is the increased transmission range with the same BER requirement and power consumption as SISO transmissions. [1] which requires exchanging more messages than needed for a direct transmission. This also increases the probability of attacks that are related to packet capturing.
Methods that narrow down the transmission area without decreasing transmission range in the desired direction, i.e., using directional antennas, may be useful.
Cooperative jamming introduces noise into the communica tion medium to hurt the eavesdropper (untrusted relay) more than the legitimate destination. An example of such a solution to mitigate the eavesdroppers in the transmission range is given in [8] , where an opportunistic selection of two relay nodes is proposed to increase security against eavesdroppers.
The first relay operates as a conventional node and assists a source to deliver its data to a destination via the Decode and-Forward strategy [9] . The second relay is used in order to create intentional interference at the eavesdropper nodes.
The proposed selection technique jointly protects the primary destination against interference and jams the reception at the eavesdropper. This assumes knowledge of the existence of the eavesdropper. In [10] , the authors show that a positive secrecy rate can be achieved with the help of destination node or an external node that jams the relay by cooperative jaImning.
Resource draining attacks aim to reduce or deplete the network's resources such as the battery power of nodes and the capacity of the network, etc. A malicious node that is involved in a cooperative transmission can attack the transmission to drain the batteries of honest nodes, or occupy links by sending garbage data for a longer time to decrease the capacity of the network. Relay discovery attacks may result in high numbers of retransmissions which will drain the batteries of nodes and reduce the lifetime of the network. As mentioned before, the nodes that reside in the wide transmission range of a cooperation set (set of nodes cooperating) have to wait to be able to send their own data. In a non-cooperative transmission, a simple 4-way handshake is often enough to contend for the channel; in the vMISO case, however, transmission latency increases due to the message exchanging phase at the source and destination clusters before cooperative control packets are sent; also coding and decoding of symbols at the source and destination add to the latency. Therefore, retransmissions must be as few as possible to have a longer network lifetime.
In [11] , two types of resource draining attacks are addressed.
In "inside" attacks, malicious nodes send garbage infonnation to the destination when they serve as relays. . These attacks occur when attackers inject an overwhelming amount of traffic into the network to consume good nodes' valuable network resources and reduce the network's lifetime. In cooperative mobile ad hoc networks, nodes will usually unconditionally forward packets for other nodes. Consequently, such networks are extremely vulnerable to injecting traffic attacks, especially those launched by inside attackers. In [12], two types of injecting traffic attacks that can be launched in cooperative ad hoc networks are mentioned: query flooding attack and injecting data packet attack (IDPA). Fortunately, in cooperative ad hoc networks, since nodes belong to the same authority and pursue conunon goals, it is possible that they can know each other's data packet injection statistics. According to the solution proposed in [12], detecting injecting traffic attacks is equivalent to detecting those nodes who are not legitimate, yet they inject packets into the network or whose packet injection rates are much higher than their legitimate upper bounds. Also, legitimate nodes add a header to their packets along with a signature. The maximum number of allowed hops and signatures in the headers are used by honest nodes in order to decide if there exists a malicious node on the route and whether to forward a packet to the next hop or not.
C. Key Pre-distribution in Sensor Networks
One of the problems in the security of sensor networks is that the nodes cannot store a lot of keys and it is not wise to use a single key that every node shares as a single node compromise can disrupt the whole network. To address this problem, in [13] , a key management mechanism is proposed, and it has 3 phases: key pre-distribution, shared-key discovery, and path-key establishment. The key-predistribution phase is an offline phase, where a large pool of S keys are generated. A key ring is generated from k keys that are randomly chosen from this pool. Key identifiers for each key in the key ring are loaded to a sensor node. In the shared-key discovery phase, each node discovers its neighbors in communication range with which it shares keyes). Nodes discover shared-keys by broadcasting the list of key identifiers of the keys on their key ring in clear text. After this phase, a secure link exists between two nodes if they share at least one key. In path key establishment phase, a path-key is assigned to selected pairs of nodes in wireless communication range that do not share a key but are connected by two or more links at the end of the shared-key discovery phase. The downside of this random key distribution scheme is that the probability that two nodes share a key can be small. The knowledge of the deployment of sensors [14] may be used to improve this probability to something close to 1. Multiple key pools are used in this deployment based scheme as opposed to the single global key pool S. Sensors are assumed to be deployed in clusters or groups organized into a grid. Each deployment group has its own associated group key pool that is generated from the global key pool. Keys from the global key pool are assigned to group key pools in a way that the group key pools of clusters that are geographically closer have a certain number of common keys. However, if two clusters are not neighbors, the group key pools do not share any keys. Nodes that are very far apart are thus unlikely to share any keys.
In this paper, we make use of these key pre-distribution approaches to increase the reliability of SISO and vMISO transmissions in the presence of malicious and/or compro mised nodes as explained in the following sections.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PACKET SUCCESS
WITH vMISO AND SISO TRANSMISSIONS
In this section, we describe an analytical framework for evaluating the probability of successfully delivering a packet with SISO and vMISO transmissions in the presence of malicious nodes in the system.
A. Outage Probability and Transmission Range
Based on [2], we first derive here an expression for the relationship between the outage probability, the number of cooperating nodes, and the increase in transmission range possible with vMISO. We assume a narrow-band multi-path wireless channel with a coherence time longer than the symbol transmission time. This channel is modeled as a flat Rayleigh fading channel with a path-loss exponent (3. All nodes have omni-directional antennas and emit signals at the same power Pt. The large scale path loss for a transmitter-receiver distance of dis, K d-13, where K is a constant that is typically a function of A, the wavelength. For a certain packet trans mission, each transmitted signal goes over an independent Rayleigh fading channel and it is corrupted by a zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Let 0: be a Rayleigh distributed random variable with parameter a = l. We note here that 10:12 has an exponential distribution. Under Rayleigh fading with SISO, the signal strength S8 = Pod ; 1310:12 at the receiver is exponentially distributed, where Po = Pt x K. Here d s is the distance between the SISO transmitter and receiver.
Let O: i for i = 1,2,·· . ,n be independent random fading coefficients with Rayleigh-distributed magnitude and uniform phase. If there are n cooperating transmitters i = 1,2, ... ,n in vMISO at distances d i from the receiver, the signal strength S i of the i-th cooperating node's signal at the receiver will be Po 1 O: i 12 d ; 13 and the overall signal strength will be S = Po 2:7=110: i I2d ; 13. If we make the assumption that the d ; 's are very close and equal to d v , the signal strength at the receiver is S v = Pod :;; 13 2:7=1 IO: i I2. Note that 2:7=1 IO: i l2 has a X2 distribution with 2n degrees of freedom.
The quality of the wireless link can be measured by the instantaneous bit error rate (BER). It is well-known that spatial diversity can help transmit with a lower total energy per symbol, while satisfying the same BER requirement [15] .
However, the analysis involving BER must assume a cer tain modulation class and involves complicated mathematical functions. A more general way to capture the link quality is through the outage probability, Pout, defined as the probability that the instantaneous signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR), SN Ri, falls below a certain threshold. If the coherence time is greater than the packet transmission time, the outage probability is time invariant for a given packet transmission. Suppose that Sth is the minimum required signal strength for correct decoding at the receiver for a target outage probability Pout (assuming that the AWGN does not change with time). Then, the outage probability for the random signal strength S at the receiver can be calculated as, [2] can be expressed as:
We note here that the number of cooperating nodes n appears as an argument through the degrees of freedom of the X2 distribution.
B. Probability of Success without Malicious Nodes
First, let us suppose that a source node wishes to send a packet to a destination node at distance D using only SISO transmissions. Let the minimum number of hops given an outage probability Pout be Ks = I £ l· If there are no malicious nodes in the network, the probability that a packet is successfully received at the destination is equal to the probability that the packet is successfully received on every hop, 
With no malicious nodes in the network and n cooperating nodes to transmit a data from a source to a destination that is Ks SISO hops away, vMISO has better transmission reliability than SISO if Iv(n, Pout, 13) = n r G (s f3 ) l -Ks < 0, given I n Po'trt, an outage probability Pout and path-loss exponent 13.
Proof" When we compare (7) and (8), vMISO performs better than SISO when,
• Theorem 1 says that the performance of vMISO compared to SISO depends on 13, n and Pout. It is not possible to simplify this further easily due to the ceiling function used to calculate the number of hops. We plot Iv = nKv -Ks in Figure 2 to show n and Pout values for which vMISO is more reliable than SISO, Iv < 0 (from Theorem 1), when 13 = 3. From this figure, we observe that for vMISO to perform better, Pout and n must be small, or as Pout gets larger, n must be smaller. When 13 = 4, the ranges for n and Pout for which vMISO is better is narrower than for 13 = 3.
C. Probability of Success with Malicious Nodes
Next we consider the setup of routes between sources and destinations in the network and the impact that malicious nodes may have on the probability of successfully receiving a packet at the destination. We assume that source and des tination nodes are honest nodes and any malicious node will participate in generating the route with the idea of dropping or corrupting data packets later. Let "( be the fraction of honest nodes in the network. Without any means of verifying whether or not a node in the network is malicious, the probability of picking a malicious node on a route depends on 1 -"(. We further let 15s be the degree of a node (the number of neighbors) in SISO range ds. Then, 15s consists of both honest nodes and malicious nodes When there is no mechanism to verify a node's trustworthi ness, an honest node cannot differentiate between honest and malicious neighbors; therefore, the fraction of honest nodes is "( = �:. For a forwarding node to be on a "successful" route from a source to a destination (i.e., packets are not lost due to malicious activity), it should have at least 2 honest nodes in its SISO range (the previous and the next node on route). The probability that a source node chooses an honest forwarding node h as the next hop node (from Figure 1) is "(, and the probability that h chooses another honest node 12 (excluding the source node) will be 1 -O�: I ' When 15s > > 1 , this probability approaches "( = �:. Similarly, if the density of nodes is high, and the fraction 1 -"( of malicious nodes is also high, for simplicity, we can assume that this fraction does not change when a few nodes are already picked to be on a route. Essentially then, the probability of picking a malicious node as an intermediate node is 1 -"(.
On a SISO route of length Ks hops, none of the Ks -1 intermediate nodes (e.g., h, 12, h in Figure 1 ) must be malicious for the packet to be received successfully at the destination. Thus we have,
When vMISO transmissions with n cooperating nodes are employed, the computation of success probability is more complex. This is because, in this case, each forwarding node in vMISO range must be chosen from the honest neighboring nodes, and in addition, each cooperating relay in SISO range must be chosen from the honest nodes. Let Pn be the proba bility that an honest source node chooses n -1 honest relay nodes in its SISO range to cooperate with them in a single hop vMISO. Then, i= n -2 15h -i = "( x II 15 -i ' i=I s
We note that Pn increases with increasing 15h (and corre spondingly 15s) although "( is constant. The reason is that the probability of selecting n -1 cooperating relays in a larger There are three cases we consider:
In Figure 3 , we show Pn and "( ( n -I ) , its approximation, for simplifying the analysis for various n. The observations from this figure validates that the approximation is very close to the exact value of Pn. For small n, n < 1 0 the difference is less than 0.01, and as n increases the error also increases. However, even for n = 20, the error is less than 0.03.
In a multi-hop vMISO route of length Kv hops, there exist Kv vMISO transmissions, and Kv -1 forwarding nodes. Then, the success probability is given as, p v MISO = (1 _ P ) n Kv X (P ) Kv x ",(Kv-I) su e out n f Theorem 2 (vMISO reliability with malicious nodes):
When there exist malicious nodes in the network, but no mechanism exists to distinguish between them, using vMISO with n cooperating nodes to transmit a data from a source to destination at distance Ks SISO hops has better transmission reliability if Iv (n,pout,/3) = n I Gn (:':: , ,,6) 1 < Ks given the same outage probability requirement, Pout and path loss exponent, (3.
Proof To simplify the analysis, we can compare P s v u Af. I so and Pss ,!cso ((12) and (lO)) under three different cases:
This condition is similar to the case when there are no malicious nodes in the network, since the terms including "( in (lO) and (12) can be neglected. Pn in (12) can also be neglected since it is also a function of "(. Then, this condition is in line with Theorem 1. 2) Second case:
1 -Pout = "( and Pn � "( ( n -I ) : This condition is possible when 15h -+ 00 and 15h > > n which results in Pn � "( ( n -I ) . Then (lO) and (12) can be re- Then, comparing (l3) and (14), vMISO performs better than SISO when Iv = nKv -Ks < O.
3) Third case: I > > 1 -Po u t and P n � ,(n-l): Under this condition, the ( 1 -Po u t ) terms in (10) and (12) can be neglected, and they can be re-written as,
(16)
When we compare (15) and (16), vMISO performs better
Note that in the presence of malicious nodes in the network and without a mechanism (e.g., shared keys) to identify malicious nodes, all three cases result in the same condition Iv = n Kv -Ks < 0 for a Kv hops vMISO route to outperform a Ks hops SISO route in terms of successful packet reception probability for given (3 and Po u t.
• From Theorems 1 and 2, we observe that the condition for multi-hop vMISO to outperform multi-hop SISO in terms of success probability in the presence of malicious nodes and with no mechanism for distinguishing between honest and malicious nodes is the same as the condition for multi-hop vMISO to outperform multi-hop SISO when there are no malicious nodes in the network. This observation is a result of the approximation made in calculating Pn.
D. Using Partial Trust with Malicious Nodes
In this section, we investigate the effect of employing shared keys for trust between honest nodes in the network. Depending on the type of key pre-distribution scheme, it is likely that an honest node will share keys with some of its neighbors, and not share any keys with some of them. Furthermore, malicious nodes may compromise keys of honest nodes in order to thwart the trust mechanism utilized between honest nodes. The key sharing mechanism for trust and the key compromising probability of malicious nodes may affect what we call "the degree" of a node. This degree refers to the number of neighbors that a node trusts based on shared keys, even though some of them may be malicious. Let 7] be the probability that two honest nodes share at least one common key and Pm be the probability that an honest node shares a common key with a malicious node in its SISO neighborhood.
Then, "the degree" of a node becomes
We note that degree o� [14] , and random key pre-distribution [3] . The probability that a node shares a common key with nodes in its neighborhood is larger with 7 
In single-hop vMISO transmission, the probability that a source node chooses n -1 honest nodes out of o� nodes in SISO range is, . Then, the success8 probability is, p �u� ISO = ( 1 -p o u t ) nKv x ( p�) Kv x I �Kv-l) , (1 9 ) where in the calculation of P� , the key sharing probability is 7] = 1, whereas in the calculation of Iv, the key sharing probability may be 0 :s; 7] :s; 1.
Now the success probability depends on IS and I V instead of only I in addition to Po u t, nand (3. Following the second condition in the proof of Theorem 2, let I S 3) When Pm --7 'fI = 1 in SISO case, "(S --7 "(; therefore, success probability (17) approaches (10) . Similarly, in the vMISO case, when Pm --7 'fI, "(v --7 "( and P� --7 Pn; therefore, (19) approaches (12). We recall that (10) and (12) are valid when there is no trust mechanism in the presence of malicious nodes in the network. This is expected when Pm = 'fI, because the trust mechanism cannot differentiate between malicious and honest nodes. 2) Using random key pre-distribution: In the case of ran dom key pre-distribution schemes, a node shares keys with its neighbors and with nodes that are far away with equal probability (0 � 'fI � 1). Therefore, the success probability of SISO is affected by both key sharing probability of honest nodes, 'fI, and the fraction of compromised nodes, Pm. The success probability with SISO is given in (17) where the probability that an intermediate node in SISO range is honest is calculated from
Similarly, in the case of vMISO, P� and "(v are calculated with given 0 � 'fI � 1, and the success probability is given in (19). Therefore, we can again use (20) for analysis:
1) With random key pre-distribution schemes, "(S = "(v'
2) With no compromised nodes Pm = 0, "(s = "(v = 1 and P� = 1. Then, following the same analogy as in the case with deployment based schemes, Theorem 2 is valid when random key pre-distribution schemes are employed.
3) When Pm --7 'fI, "(S --7 "( and "(v --7 "(; therefore, the success probability (17) approaches (10) , and (19) approaches (12). Therefore, Theorem 1 is valid when random key pre-distribution schemes are employed. Psuc versus nand Ks, no malicious nodes, f3 = 3, Pout = 0.001
50
Psuc versus nand Ks, no malicious nodes, f3 = 3,Pout = 0.01
IV. RESULTS
A. Success Probability Without Malicious Nodes Figure 4 shows the probability of success with SISO and vMISO transmissions with respect to nand Ks when (3 = 3
and Pout = 10-3 . Pout and (3. We also observe a reduction in the number of cooperating nodes for vMISO to be more efficient than SISO with larger (3 although Pout is kept the same.
B. Success Probability With Malicious Nodes
In Figure 7 , we show Ps�so and p� u !v[ISO for various values of K s and n using (l3) and (14). We have picked Pout = 1 -, = 10-3 , and used (3 = 3 which provides moder ate distance gains with cooperative transmissions. Also, a high number of honest node degree is assumed Oh = 200 > > 1 for approximating P n ;::: :; , n -I . W hen compared to Figure 4 , SISO and vMISO success probabilities decreased approximately by a factor of , K , -I and , nK v -l , respectively. We emphasize that since Pout and (3 are the same for both cases, the relation between performance comparison are the same for both cases, Iv = nKv -K s > 0 for nand K s for higher vMISO success probability.
In Figure 8 , Psuc with SISO and vMISO are given for (3 = 3, , = 1 -Pout. We pick the distance between the �=3, y=0.999, K,=30 We observe that the approximation P n ;::: :; , n -I provides a success probability which is very close to its actual value.
Another observation is that with larger Pout, the number of cooperating nodes must be small n < 5 for vMISO to be better.
C. Success Probability With Key Pre-distribution Schemes and Pm = 0.2 as expected. We also see that the best number of cooperating nodes is n = 4 for the scenario considered in Figures 10 and 11 . W hen n = 4, Gn(Pout,/3) = 7.5381 and Iv = nKv -Ks = -14 < O.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative transmissions exploit a fundamental feature of the wireless medium: the ability to achieve diversity through 10 independent channels created between the multiple transmit ters and the receiver, because these channels are likely to fade independently. With more relay nodes, a higher order of diver sity can be achieved improving the BER and/or transmission range. However, at the same time, cooperative transmissions suffer from drawbacks from a security point of view due to the involvement of additional parties to the communication. In this paper, we evaluate the tradeoffs between using cooperative transmissions or not for reliable transmission of packets in sensor networks with a mix of honest and malicious nodes.
We showed that when the number of honest nodes in the neighborhood of a node is much higher than the number of cooperating nodes (n), at high outage probability, vMISO with small n outperforms SISO in terms of successful transmission probability. We also derived a general condition (under simpli fying approximations) for all cases where vMISO outperforms SISO.
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